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Abstract 
 
The aims of this paper are twofold. The first is to analyse the interaction between research and 
development (R&D) activities of firms and heterogeneous consumer preferences in structuring the 
evolution of an industry. The second is to explore the effects of patent life and patent breadth on 
market outcomes. To answer these research questions, an evolutionary, multi-agent based, sector-
level cumulative innovation model is designed. The model addresses supply and demand sides of 
the market simultaneously with the co-evolution of heterogeneous consumer preferences, 
heterogeneous firm knowledge bases and technology levels at the micro level. In line with the 
evolutionary modelling tradition, we have a search algorithm-innovation and imitation of products 
by firms – a selection of algorithm-revealed preferences of the consumers – and a population of 
objects in which variation is expressed and on which selection operates: namely, firms (Windrum, 
2004). Firms compete on quality and price of their products in an oligopolistic market whereas 
consumers, constrained by their computational limits, act to maximize their utility with their 
product choices in a boundedly rational way. There is continuous firm entry and exit depending on 
the competitive performance of the firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Use of patents for the sake of technological progress and wealth creation is a long lasting debate in 
economics. As a policy tool to intervene in a subject as complex as technology development, it is 
easy to understand why patents cause such controversy. It is a very compelling if not an 
impossible endeavour to isolate the effects of patents from those of other factors on policy targets 
due to severe interaction. Even if that is achieved, one should discriminate between short and long 
run effects and effects on different agents in a market. 
 
A patent is a form of intellectual property and it gives the patent holder the exclusive rights over 
an invention for a limited period. Until the patent expires, others are prevented from using this 
invention which gives the original inventor a temporary monopoly power to collect the returns to 
their investment in R&D. Thereby inventors are provided with the required financial incentives to 
continue with their technology development activities in exchange for the disclosure of the 
knowledge embodied in the patent. However, the use of patents as an incentive to engage in R&D 
is not costless to society. Granting exclusive rights to the patent holder creates a monopoly which 
introduces inefficiencies to market. Besides patents can be a serious impediment to further 
technological developments. 
 
Once the policy makers decide to set a patent system, the obvious following question will be how 
strong a patent system this will be. For how long will a firm be given monopoly power over its 
new invention? What is the range of products the competitors are prevented from using due to 
patent enforcement? Hence, what are the optimum patent length and patent breadth, respectively 
in order to realize the fastest technological and economical progress possible? These are the 
questions a patent authority should answer in designing a patent system. 
 
This study is an agent-based modelling (ABM) exercise to simulate the dynamics of an R&D 
driven sector and to observe the effects of patent length and patent breadth on market outcomes. 
Firms engage in innovation or imitation activities to compete in product markets. Heterogeneous 
consumers make the best possible purchases that fit best with their preferences. These preferences 
co-evolve with technology production by firms. Demand is differentiated and new products create 
new sub-markets loosely competing with the existing ones.  
 
ABM is the most frequently utilized technique in evolutionary settings (Grebel & Pyka, 2003). In 
case of innovation at industry level, we are exploring a highly decentralized dynamic search 
process under strong substantive and procedural uncertainty, where numerous heterogeneous 
agents search in parallel for new products/processes, but are interlinked through market and non-
market interactions (Dawid, 2006). Several evolutionary modelling exercises in the literature 
repeatedly showed that ABM is capable of simulating such a platform where these peculiarities 
are successfully mapped into model designs. Furthermore, ABM is offering a platform for inter 
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and trans-disciplinary research, which is again congruent with the requirements of innovation 
studies. With agent-based modelling, we hope to stretch the trade-off between simplicity in 
modelling and the complexity of the socio-economic reality. 
 
There are a few advantages of this evolutionary model over the ones in the relevant literature. To 
begin with, it is one of the few models studying two patent dimensions (patent length and breadth) 
simultaneously from an agent-based perspective. Secondly, whereas most evolutionary models 
focus on process innovation, this one exclusively models product innovation, i.e. technical 
progress is embodied in products. The third is that firms compete both in the R&D process and 
goods market rather than in any one of them. Lastly, rather than single-product firms, the market is 
populated with multi-product firms which can serve to different niches of consumers concurrently. 
With the continuous introduction of new innovations, products transform from undiscovered to 
discovered and then from cutting edge product to obsolete. As the product space steadily shifts, 
the consumers are compelled to redefine their product choices within the given product range. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a literature review on patents where the 
pros and cons of having a patent system, the concept of sequential innovation, the role of patents 
when innovation is sequential, and the effect of patent scope from an empirical and theoretical 
perspective are discussed. In section 3, the research topic is explained. Section 4 details the 
simulation model. In section 5, the results of the simulation analyses are discussed. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. Why do (should) we have patents? 
 
A strong rationale for patents is protecting innovators from imitators. By preventing imitators 
from selling goods embodying patented technologies, patent holders are given the exclusive rights 
to enjoy profits on their inventions either by commercialization or licensing their technologies. 
These temporary monopoly rents enhance the incentive for the innovators to engage in R&D 
activities. Patents also create incentives to disclose and trade technology so that others can use and 
build upon research results (Encaoua, Dominique, and Catalina, 2006; Gallini, 1992). 
 
Patent protection is justified by specific particularities of technical knowledge: non-rivalry and 
non-excludability. Knowledge has a non-rival character, which means that once an invention is 
known, everyone can use it with no additional cost. Non-excludability means once knowledge is 
created by an agent, others cannot be excluded from using it. Hence, technical knowledge is a 
source of externalities in R&D and traditional economic theory claims that patent protection is a 
possible remedy for this free-rider problem (Encaoua et al., 2006; Vallée & Yildizoglu, 2006).  
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2.2. Why shouldn’t we have patents? 
 
Creating monopoly rents for the patent holder is a costly endeavour for society. The monopolist’s 
profit maximizing price will be higher than welfare maximizing price for the society and this will 
create a deadweight loss. We can add to this loss the costs of bureaucracy (strongly increased 
during the recent patent surge), court personnel and lawyers. This means a large amount of 
financial resources diverted from the innovation process itself (Encaoua et al., 2006). Patent rights 
advocates argue that this static deadweight loss is more than compensated in the long run with 
faster technological progress due to stronger incentives to do R&D. Hence, one should 
discriminate between short-run and long-run effects of patents on market outcomes (Bessen & 
Maskin 2009).  
 
A specific patent policy constitutes a trade-off between encouragement of prior innovation and 
reduction of incentives for subsequent research. Before the patent is granted, there is every 
incentive to compete in the patent race as the reward is still there waiting for the winner.  But once 
the race is over and one of the competitors is granted the patent, others are discouraged to continue 
R&D, since the next innovation may infringe the previous patent. Some studies (e.g. Heller & 
Eisenberg, 1998) emphasize the negative effects of patenting initial inventions on subsequent 
innovations (building patent fences around discrete innovations constituting patent thickets), while 
others endorse stronger protection of early innovators who opened new fields of research (see, for 
example, Kitch (1997) and the critiques in Merges and Nelson (1990)) (Koo & Wright 2003; 
Vallée & Yildizoglu, 2006). That a firm is exploiting intellectual property rights (IPR) invariably 
raises the costs that other firms incur when trying to access and utilize existing knowledge (Dosi, 
Marengoa, and Pasquali, 2006). Alongside, patent races create some duplication of resources and 
they are much more oriented to creating substitutes than complementary goods, which poses a 
coordination problem (Eswaran & Gallini, 1996).  
 
Teece (1986) states that profits from innovation depend upon the interaction of three families of 
factors, namely: appropriability regimes, complementary assets, and the presence or absence of a 
dominant paradigm. Appropriability conditions, in addition to patent and copyright protection, 
include secrecy, lead times, costs and time required for duplication, learning, sales and service 
assets. Apart from profiting from innovation, according to Dosi et al. (2006), evidence suggests 
that, first, appropriability conditions are just one among many (possibly a second order one) 
determining the propensity to innovate. The relative importance of the various factors and their 
interaction is highly sector and technology specific. The rates of innovation, they suggest, 
fundamentally depend on paradigm-specific opportunities rather than on mere appropriability 
conditions (at least above some threshold) and even less so on the specific subset of 
appropriability devices represented by legal IPR protection. They also add that the differential 
ability of individual firms to economically benefit from innovation stem from idiosyncratic 
organizational capabilities. 
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Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter (1987) reports that patents are by and large viewed as less 
important than learning curve advantages and lead time in order to protect product innovation and 
the least effective among appropriability means as far as process innovations are concerned. As a 
follow-up study, Cohen et al. (2000) found that firms protect profits due to invention with a range 
of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, lead time advantages and the use of complementary 
marketing and manufacturing capabilities. Patents are generally the least emphasized among these 
mechanisms by firms in the majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend 
to be emphasized most heavily. For the protection of product innovations, secrecy now appears to 
be much more heavily employed across most industries than previously. When secrecy is a 
feasible means of protection and the cost of imitation is high, first mover advantages and network 
externalities are emphasized (Encaoua et al., 2006). Pharmaceuticals and other fine chemical 
products are exceptions to this general trend, but the above is true for firms in the computer, 
semiconductor, and aircraft industries. A number of industries with relatively slow technological 
progress also reported that patents were not particularly effective for them (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 
1998). 
 
However, there are two important points any empirical study should take into account in that 
regard. The first is that the case can be completely different for large firms with an established 
presence in their product markets and thus having access to the complementary assets needed to 
commercialize the end-product of their innovative efforts than it is for a small firm which cannot 
benefit from a head start or timely establishment of an effective production and sales program, or 
rapid movement down the learning curve, unless there is some way of holding off the large 
competitors like patenting. For such firms patents can be used either as a means to appropriate 
returns through licensing or as a means to maintain control of the technology while a production 
and sales capability is established. The second point is whether the prospect of patents motivates 
firms and other organizations outside of a particular industry to undertake inventions which would 
be used inside that industry (Mazzoleni & Nelson, 1998). Some studies (e.g. Jewkes, Sawers and 
Stillerman, 1969) have reported the importance of such outsiders to technical advance in a number 
of industries.  For these industry outsiders without the complementary assets needed to appropriate 
the returns from innovation by being first to market or by rapidly moving down the learning curve, 
a patent may be essential to create incentives to invest in R&D. Once a strong patent is gained, 
such a firm can bargain a joint venture or a license deal with a firm that has production and market 
capabilities (Teece, 1986). 
 
In many areas of technology the role of patents has fundamentally changed recently. Kash and 
Kingston (2001) links the recent explosion in patent applications to their growing use as 
bargaining chips for cross-licensing issues rather than as providers of the limited monopoly 
control. Patenting is also used for other strategic reasons like constructing patent fences around 
discrete inventions and the prevention of suits. Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh (2000) finds that in 
"discrete" product industries, such as chemicals firms appear to use their patents commonly to 
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block the development of substitutes by rivals whereas in "complex" product industries, such as 
telecommunications equipment or semiconductors, firms are much more likely to use patents to 
force rivals into negotiations. 
 
2.3. Sequential Innovation 
 
When innovation and imitation is sequential, each successive invention builds on its predecessors. 
In such a situation, innovation may be very valuable because it has spillover benefits for future 
innovators. Patent protection which is a necessity in a static world, since the prospect of being 
imitated inhibits inventors otherwise, becomes less important in a dynamic world with sequential 
innovation and imitation where imitation can provide benefit to both the original inventor and to 
society more generally. For industries like software and computers theory suggests that imitation 
may promote innovation and that strong patents (long-lived patents of broad scope) might actually 
inhibit it. Imitators may exploit the original innovation to develop valuable ideas not readily 
available to the first inventor. Then, the first inventor may come up with a new innovation based 
on these new ideas. If this cumulativeness is impeded by the presence of patents, the pace of 
innovation may slow down (Bessen & Maskin, 2009). If the first generation invention falls into 
the category of  “essential facilities” in the sense that there is no possibility to invent around them 
to proceed with further research (e.g. basic discoveries, genetic material and research tools), 
patenting may even block new lines of research (Encaoua et al., 2006). 
 
Nordhaus’s (1969) patent protection model with a single, isolated invention predicts that stronger 
patents will induce more investment in R&D. This model falls short of explaining innovation 
processes particularly in high technology sectors experiencing rapid technological change. Modern 
models of innovation expand upon this framework by recognizing that innovation is a cumulative 
process that builds upon previous discoveries. While stronger patents provide the patent holder 
with the means to “hold up” future innovations by threatening to litigate infringers, they also 
increase the possibility of the patent holder being held up by previous innovators. In this setting, 
the link between patent strength and innovation incentives is ambiguous. When innovation is 
cumulative, they acknowledge that follow-on researchers (as well as pioneers) respond to changes 
in patent policy. Extending the single-invention model to incorporate these features can overturn 
fundamental predictions of the basic model (Gallini, 2002). When innovation is sequential and 
complementary, imitation becomes a spur to innovation, while strong patents become an 
impediment. Bessen & Maskin (2009) conclude that even if the initial rents earned by an 
innovator in the absence of patents may be lower than with patents, the benefits that accrue to him 
when he is allowed in his turn to build around the next innovation made by a competitor may 
outweigh the current loss. 
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2.4. Patent Scope 
 
Within the context of this paper, patent scope refers to patent length and patent breadth. Patent 
length is the time period between a patent is granted and it terminates when its statutory life is 
over and patent breadth is the degree to which a product or process must differ from a patented 
one to avoid infringement of the patent. (Hunt, 2004). Patent offices grant patents to inventions 
complying with the patentability criteria of industrial application, novelty, and inventive step 
(Encaoua et al., 2006). The scope of the claims of a patent determines the ‘monopoly power’ of 
the patent holder (Merges & Nelson, 1994). Dosi et al.(2006) claims that a positive and uniform 
relation between patent scope holds only for a specific (and highly disputable) representation of 
markets, their functioning and their “failures”, on the one hand, and of knowledge and its nature 
on the other. Merges and Nelson (1990) shows that a stronger patent system can have very 
different effects on different industries distinguishing four classes of technologies in which the 
role of patents can be strongly contrasted: discrete inventions (new pharmaceuticals), cumulative 
technologies (aircraft), chemical technologies and science-based technologies (biotechnology). 
 
Whereas several studies have analysed the role of patent scope in the design of an optimal patent 
system (Green & Scotchmer, 1995; Chang, 1995; O’Donoghue, 1998), the implications of patent 
length itself in the context of a competitive dynamic research sequence have been relatively 
neglected (see Gallini (1992) for an exception). Patent with finite life has been insufficiently 
appreciated in the current literature (see Nordhaus, 1969 for an exception, Koo & Wright, 2003). 
This paper exactly targets this gap by concentrating on the implications of patent length and patent 
breadth for several market outcomes within the context of a dynamic R&D driven market with 
sequential innovation, heterogeneous firms and ever-changing consumer preferences 
(O’Donoghue, Scotchmer, and Thisse 1998). 
 
Dosi et al. (2006) suggests that appropriability is likely to display a threshold effect; a minimum 
degree of appropriability is necessary to motivate innovative effort, but above such a threshold 
further strengthening of appropriability conditions will not bring further increases of R&D 
investments and rates of innovation. Rather, social inefficiencies such as “anti-commons” effects- 
in which people underuse scarce resources because too many owners can block each other (Heller 
& Eisenberg, 1998)-, rent seeking behaviours, dissipation of quasi-rents into litigation etc. are 
much more likely to emerge. There seems to be no clear evidence of a positive relation between 
the tightening of IPR regimes and the rates of innovation. The software industry in the United 
States presented itself as a natural experiment in the 1980s and 1990s. Patent protection for 
computer programs was significantly strengthened by several court decisions. Evidence suggests 
that the firms that acquired most of these patents actually reduced their R&D spending relative to 
sales (Bessen & Hunt, 2004). 
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In an international analysis of the relationship between patent strength and innovation, Lerner 
(2001) examines 177 policy shifts in 60 countries over 150 years. Patent strength is measured by 
four features: a) whether protection existed in whole or in part for important technologies; b) the 
duration of the patent; c) the patent fee; and d) the existence of various limitations on patent 
awards (for example, compulsory licensing). The dependent variable is the growth of patent 
applications by residents in the country and the independent variables include a dummy variable 
on whether the policy change is protection enhancing or reducing and the strength of protection 
prior to the change, among other controls. Lerner finds some support for an “inverted-U” 
relationship between patent strength and innovation. That is, strengthening patents has a positive 
effect on innovation if protection is initially low and a negative impact if patent protection is 
initially high (Gallini, 2002). 
 
In their essay on the effects of the scope of a patent, Merges and Nelson (1994) argues that this 
depends on the topography of technical advance in a field, in particular on how inventions are 
linked to each other, and in the extent to which rapid technical advance requires a diversity of 
actors and minds, as contrasted with being facilitated by express coordination of inventive activity. 
They examined technical advance in several different fields, with a focus on how patents 
influenced the pace and quality of development. They conclude that allowing and enforcing broad 
patent claims tends to hinder technical progress. 
 
From a theoretical point of view, the standard analysis of optimal patent life is based on the 
Nordhaus (1969) model of an independent, stand-alone innovation that reduces the production cost 
of a consumer good. A finite optimal patent life balances the gain in size of the cost-reducing 
innovation from an increased period of monopoly granted by the patent against the associated 
deadweight loss from higher cost to consumers due to an extension of the period in which 
royalties must be paid. However, this model assumes no competition in the innovation process 
(Koo & Wright, 2003). 
 
Gallini’s (1992) model with positive imitation costs predict that an increase in patent life over 
some range may have no effect on or paradoxically may reduce both R&D activity and the 
incentive to patent. The explanation is that increasing the length of patent protection gives rivals a 
greater incentive to imitate (invent around) a patented product: the longer the patent life, the 
longer rivals must wait to use the technology. Increasing patent life increases the number of 
competing products, thus reducing any added incentives to research and to disclose the innovation 
that typically result from longer patent protection. These effects have implications for optimal 
patent policy. When the length of patent protection is the only tool of patent authorities, she shows 
that optimal patent life is generally short to discourage imitation. When the patent policy is 
extended to include both patent life and patent breadth, social surplus is maximized when patents 
are broad (no imitation) and patent life is adjusted to achieve the desired patent reward. She adds 
that her results contrast sharply with those of Tandon (1982), Gilbert and Shapiro (1990), and, to 
some extent, Klemperer (1990), in which narrow, infinitely long patents are optimal and explains 
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this with the increasing costly imitation that displaces the patentee's output as patent life increases. 
The previous literature noted here considers market situations in which imitation, while 
constraining the innovator's profits, never occurs in equilibrium for any patent life. 
 
Winter (1993) uses a simple evolutionary model of innovation and imitation to compare the 
properties of the dynamics of a simulated industry with and without patent protection. They show 
that the total surplus is lower under the patent regime than under the non-patent one and the non-
patent regime yields significantly higher total investment in R&D and produces higher best 
practice productivity. 
 
In their 1998 study, O’Donoghue et al. observe that the profitability of R&D depends on the 
effective patent life, and that effective patent life is determined not only by statutory patent life but 
also by patent breadth. They ask the question whether patents should be long-lived but narrow, so 
that they effectively expire at an endogenous time when a better product is made or they should be 
relatively broad but short-lived, so that the effective patent life coincides with the statutory patent 
life. They find that the two policies are not equivalent, even if both lead to the same rate of 
innovation. To sustain a given rate of innovation, the effective patent life in the first policy must 
be longer than the effective (statutory) patent life in the second policy, which exacerbates the 
inefficiencies due to market power (O’Donoghue et al., 1998). 
 
Vallée and Yildizoglu (2006) claim that the main results are generally too strongly sensitive to the 
rational expectations (or perfect foresight) assumption and to the assumed homogeneity of the 
firms for the patent race models. Alternatively, they develop an evolutionary model of industry 
dynamics in order to carry out a richer theoretical analysis of the consequences of a stronger 
patent system. Their results do not favour the case for a stronger patent system: higher social 
welfare and technical progress are observed in their model in industries with milder patent systems 
(lower patent height and patent life). 
 
Marengo, Pasquali, Valente, and Dosi (2009) develops a model of product innovation and industry 
evolution in complex product industries and shows that strong patent regimes are likely to hinder 
rather than foster innovation. Their results are driven by two major properties of technologies and 
markets for complex products. First, both innovative and imitative search are costly and difficult, 
with complementarities and interdependencies among components putting heavy constraints on 
possible search paths. If many of these possible paths are blocked by patents, very few 
opportunities for further innovation might be left open. Second, competition in these complex 
product spaces typically proceeds through the creation of sub-markets: demand is heterogeneous 
and firms can diversify products by offering different combinations of components and 
characteristics. Competition is not a winner-takes-all process, but is mainly a never ending 
creation of new sub-markets. They conclude that that product complexity is a key factor 
determining the long run efficiency or inefficiency of the patent system. 
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3. Research Topic 
 
The patent literature concludes that a patent system entails several trade-offs.  A strong patent 
regime provides the necessary incentives to do more R&D, because firms know that they can 
capitalize on their innovations. On the other hand this protection may lead to overly concentrated 
markets or even monopolies which create static inefficiencies. Monopoly pricing which is made 
possible by strong patents means higher costs and hence decreased utility for the consumers. This 
literature also suggests that if innovation is sequential the results achieved by models of single, 
isolated innovations overturn. Strong patents turn into an impediment rather than a spur to 
innovation. Patent authorities determine the patent scope to strike a balance between the benefits 
and costs of having a patent system. 
 
This paper analyses how market outcomes are conditioned by patent scope. One will observe how 
patent scope determines the extent of monopoly power of the market leader, hence concentration 
rate and market sharing between innovators vs. imitators, the pace of technological progress and 
wealth creation in the market. With this aim, firstly the model will show how firms and consumers 
interact in the market environment and how this interaction leads to technological progress. Firms 
compete on price and quality of their products and they engage in innovation and imitation 
activities to increase their quality. Consumers shift their preferences towards higher quality 
products as technology progresses. Firms reaching higher quality levels on the quality ladder 
earlier than their competitors gain a competitive edge in the market. Buyers are heterogeneous and 
markets are segmented.  
.  
4. The Model 
 
This is an agent-based model, agents being firms and consumers. The agents follow pre-specified 
heuristics (e.g. innovation routines, marketing expenses, product purchases) and react to 
competitors and environmental conditions (e.g. pricing) and the interactions between these agents 
at the micro level determine macro outcomes. The model will show how these outcomes are 
conditioned by the parameters of interest. 
 
Firms pick a price for their goods and put them on the market for consumers’ purchase. To make 
their products visible to potential buyers they make some marketing expenses. Consumers sample 
a few products and compare them with their previous experiences to buy one that fits best with 
their preferences. A part of the revenue raised with product sales finances firms’ R&D activities. 
In accordance with its strategy a firm makes either an innovation or imitation to add a new product 
to its portfolio. An innovation is granted a patent if it meets the criteria imposed by the patent 
authority. Depending upon their competitive performances goods and incumbent firms leave the 
market leaving their places to new generation of goods and newcomer firms, respectively. 
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4.1. Technology Space 
 
Each product and technology (knowledge) embodied by this product is labelled by an integer 
number. The words “product”, “quality” and “technology” will be used interchangeably in the 
following. A bigger number corresponds to a higher quality product and a better technology. The 
units digit of this number shows the version of the product while the rest of the number shows the 
class the product belongs to. As an example, the number 23 refers to the third version of the 
second class of products. Hence, each class consists of ten versions. A class is significantly 
different from any other in terms of its technological level whereas there are only incremental 
differences between versions in this regard. Products high on the quality ladder (Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991a; 1991b) -products belonging to higher classes or higher versions within a given 
class- are intrinsically better than the lower ones. The distance between the highest version in a 
given class and lowest version in a consecutive higher class is a parameter of the model and there 
are no defined products in between. Hence the technology space resembles an infinite series of 
quality ladders on top of each other, each ladder stands for a technology class and each step for a 
version, and a move from one class to the next requires a jump between the ladders which is only 
possible with a radical innovation. 
 
4.2. Demand and Supply Structure 
 
Firms compete on quality and price of their differentiated products in an oligopolistic market. 
There are no production quantity constraints on the firms and all demand is satisfied in every 
period, there is no stock accumulation or unsatisfied demand. The production cost of a product is 
linearly related with its quality. Price is initialized as a mark-up over cost and this is the minimum 
price allowed, which means that sales of a product always bring positive profits and ceteris 
paribus higher quality products mean higher profits. Pricing strategy is a dynamic mark-up 
heuristic through which firms decide price of each good every period as a function of quality of 
and profits from that product. Specifically, the proportional change in price is a linear function of 
the proportional change in the profits on that product in the last two periods. The responsiveness 
of price to a change in profit is smoothed by a parameter s . A product with no sales in the last but 
one period is priced at its initial price.  
 
( ) ( )C n mq n   ( 4.1) 
( ) (1 ) ( )p n C n      (4.2)  
( , 1) ( ) ( ( )(( ( , ) ( , 1)) / ( , 1)))p n t p t s p t n t n t n t         (4.3)  
 
where ( ) :C n  cost of product n  
           :m cost multiplier 
          ( ) :q n quality of product n    
          ( ) :ip n initial price of product n  
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          : mark-up rate 
          ( , ) :p n t price of product n at time t  
           s : smoothing parameter 
           ( , )n t :profit on product n at time t  
 
If a product’s average market share over a specific number of periods is below a threshold level, it 
is deleted from the market. A firm with no products to sell goes bankrupt. Every period a single 
firm enters the market as an exact copy of an already existing firm, except for its innovation 
strategy that is randomly determined. The firms that are copied by the new entrants are selected 
among the firms below a certain market share. This seems a reasonable approximation of reality 
because in practice most firms start small (de Wit, 2005; Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988).  
 
Consumers have what we call a memory set which consists of a number of goods selected among 
all the products the consumer considered to buy in the previous periods. This selection is based on 
the utility level the product would bring to the consumer in case of a purchase. At every period, 
the consumer checks whether the products in the memory set are still provided by the market. If 
any of them is removed from the market, it is replaced by a new randomly selected product. Again 
at every period, consumers randomly sample a number of products from randomly selected firms. 
The probability that a product is selected is proportional to the marketing expenses by the firm on 
that product.  
 
A constant share of the last period’s revenue, which is equal for each firm, is spent on marketing 
activities to make goods visible to the consumers and this marketing budget is shared among 
products according to their quality level. Specifically, the visibility of a good is the average of the 
marketing expenses on that good for the last five periods. Price is initialized as a mark-up over 
cost, which is a linear function of quality, and this is the minimum price allowed. Hence higher 
quality products bring higher profits and this is why goods consume a share of marketing budget 
in proportion to their quality. 
 
 The newly selected product is compared with the current minimum utility promising product in 
the memory set and replaces this if it corresponds to a higher utility level for the consumer. Out of 
this dynamically structured memory set, the good that brings the highest utility is chosen to buy in 
every period. There are no income constraints faced by the consumers. This product selection 
heuristic is a decent representation of the basic evolutionary processes of reproduction-keeping the 
highest utility promising products from the previous periods-, selection-choosing among products 
to maximize utility-, and variation-a continuous and random selection of new products-. The 
existence of a memory set and the peculiar way products become visible to the consumers enable 
us to model brand loyalty and advertising effects, respectively (Malerba, Nelson, Orsenigo, and 
Winter, 1999). 
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Utility is a positive function of the quality and a negative function of the price, and the distance 
between product’s profile and idiosyncratic ideal good specific to each customer profile (Marengo 
& Valente, 2010). At the outset, the consumers position themselves within the available 
technology space into consumer profiles or let us say, submarkets. The number of submarkets is 
constant and each submarket corresponds to a point in the technology space between current 
minimum and maximum quality levels. The total number of consumers is uniformly distributed  
 
 
Figure 1. A histogram showing the uniform distribution of the customers’ 
ideal product profiles within the available technology space 
 
into these submarkets and this relative positioning somewhere between the minimum and 
maximum available technology level in the market is constant through the simulation run. Figure 1 
exemplifies this distribution. This formulation allows one to model heterogeneity in consumer 
preferences; consumers consist of early adopters with a strong preference for high-tech goods, 
low-price lovers who are content with low quality goods and the ones seeking a balance between 
price and quality. As technology develops-the level of minimum and maximum available 
technology improves-, preferences shift towards higher quality products increasing the quality of 
the ideal type good for each consumer. The fact that homogeneous consumers are populating 
submarkets can be interpreted either as there are as many consumers as the number of submarkets 
and each of these consumers is making a group buying every period or the submarkets consist of a 
number of homogenous consumers buying the very same product. 
 
( , , ) [ { ( ) mod( ( ),10)} mod( ( ),10)] ( , ) | ( ( ) ( , ) |iU n k t r q n q n q n p n t q n q k t                  (4.4) 
min max max( , ) ( ) ( )( ( ) ( ))iq k t q t u k q t q t                                                                                  (4.5) 
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where ( , , ) :U n k t utility of good n  for customer k  at time t  
            r :radical innovation constant 
           mod( ( ),10)q n : ( )q n mod 10 
           ( , ) :iq k t ideal good profile for consumer k at time t  
           min ( ) :q t minimum quality level at time t 
           max ( )q t :maximum quality level at time t 
 ( ) :u k a random pick from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1 for each customer at the 
outset 
 
The first part of the utility function in the square brackets gives the positive utility derived from 
the quality of the product. This part is separated into two dimensions: the class that the product 
belongs to, as given by the part in the curly brackets, and the version of the product within that 
class which is represented by the unit digit of the product quality number. This separation between 
class and version of a product in utility terms requires us to use modular operation. 
Modular operation finds the remainder of division of one number by another. To give an example, 
A mod B can be thought of as the remainder, on division of A by B. The divisor (B in our 
example) in our case is 10, because there are exactly 10 versions within each class. A distinction is 
made between the class and version of a product since consumers attach different levels of values 
to these dimensions.  
 
Consumers care more about the class of a product rather than its version within a given class. This 
distinction is operationalized by the parameter r . The parameter r is defined as the radical 
innovation constant and determines, ceteris paribus, by how much two consecutive versions in 
different classes differ from each other compared to two consecutive versions in the same class in 
utility terms. To put it another way, r  indicates by how much the first version in a class is 
evaluated better than the last version in a lower class in comparison to one version is evaluated 
higher than a one degree lower version in the same class holding all else constant. The higher r the 
higher is the possibility that higher class products will be preferred over lower class products. r 
1 presents a special case where there is no more a distinction between the class and the version of 
a product. Under such a circumstance it will take longer for the inferior products to be eliminated, 
product range will increase and technological change and hence wealth creation will slow down, 
since consumers no more put a premium on radical innovations. 
 
The price of a product appears in the utility function with a negative term. The last part of the 
utility function in the absolute terms gives the negative utility due to consuming a non-ideal 
product. This form of the utility function allows one to model heterogeneity in consumer tastes 
with the inclusion of the distance of the candidate product from the ideal one and to model the 
process whereby products transform from non-invented to invented and from cutting-edge to 
obsolete in time with a continuous shift of preferences towards higher quality products as 
15 
 
explained in the preceding paragraph. This process is especially accelerated with an r value higher 
than 1. 
 
4.3. Innovation and Imitation 
 
Innovation is defined as the emergence of a new product. The firm chooses a product to invest in 
from its portfolio and does R&D. The quality level of this product also shows the knowledge base 
of the firm in that specific project. Innovation size is modelled as a random pick from a Poisson 
distribution with an arrival rate which is a function of the quality of the product invested in and the 
R&D budget devoted to that project (Minniti, Parello, and Segerstrom, 2008). The arrival rate is a 
negative function of the quality of the product to invest in: complexity of the product decreases the 
likelihood of the research success. And there are diminishing returns to R&D; additional 
investments increase the arrival rate in a decreasing manner. Hence, a lower level for the 
complexity of the knowledge base and more R&D investment increases the size of an innovation.  
 
A share of the last period’s revenue is allocated to R&D every period. This share, which is limited 
between a maximum and minimum level is a function of the patent policy and market share of the 
individual firm. The longer an invention is protected by a patent (the higher the patent length) and 
the wider the range of products the competitors are prevented from using (the wider the patent 
breadth) the higher the maximum R&D share a firm is ready to spend. If a firm knows that its 
competitors will be prevented from using a wider range of products once it is granted a patent and 
that patent rights will be protected for a long period, it will increase its R&D expenses out of its 
revenues. The actual R&D intensity within these limits is inversely related with the market share 
of a firm. If a firm controls a significant share of the market, it will feel less threat from its 
competitors and cut down its R&D budget. Smaller firms are more aggressive in doing R&D. A 
negative relationship between firm size and R&D intensity is confirmed by many empirical studies 
in the literature (Ortega-Argilés & Brandsma, 2010; Akcigit, 2009; Stančík & Biagi, 2012). 
 
When innovation occurs, the resulting difference (the size of the innovation) is added to the 
chosen product’s technology level. A new product embodying a new technology and a higher 
technology base emerges. If the newly innovated product is in a higher class, then we have a 
radical innovation. Otherwise we have an incremental innovation. Depending on the radical 
innovation constant ( r ) parameter value, radical innovations may render old technologies in the 
market obsolete whereas incremental ones do not have such an impact. Hence a radical innovation 
may disturb the profit stream from the lower-class products which means that a firm can 
cannibalize its own products. This feature is introduced to the model with the specification of the 
utility function whereby higher-class products will have a market stealing effect on the lower-class 
products.  
 
In the case of a radical innovation, the size of the innovative step is large enough to cover the sum 
of the distances between the knowledge base and cutting edge technology in the respective class 
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and the distance between two consecutive classes where no products are defined. The size of an 
innovative step is limited to a maximum of one radical innovation at a time. When there is a 
radical innovation, the newly innovated product will be allowed at most to be the lowest version in 
the new class and nothing higher. This constraint negates the possibility that the knowledge base 
achieved in the previous class helps explore the technology space of the new class of products. If 
the resulting innovation appears to be in the interval between two classes where no products are 
defined, then the innovation project is assumed to fail.  
( , , )( , , )
( )
R n i tn i t
q n

                                                                                                                (4.6)                              
( , , ) ( )n i t Pois                                                                                                                    (4.7)                              
                                                                                                                  (4.8) 
                                                                                       
where ( , , ) :n i t innovation arrival rate for product n  of firm i  at time t 
          ( , , ) :R n i t R&D investment of firm i  in product n at time t  
           : innovation productivity parameter 
           :  innovation size, a random pick from a Poisson distribution with arrival rate   
           ( ) :q n quality level of the innovated product 
 
Imitation is defined as creating an exact copy of another firm’s product. Once the product to invest 
in is chosen within a firm’s own portfolio, the firm determines the expected size of the imitative 
step given its R&D budget and base technology. Then, it searches through the product sets of 
other firms to find this prospective target product. If this product is not innovated yet or not extant 
anymore, the firm seeks for a one step lower technology. If needs be, the firm repeats this search 
cycle with the next base product. After this search process is over, if no viable imitation projects 
can be determined, idle R&D budget is transferred to the R&D budget of the next period. The size 
of the imitative step is modelled with the same function given for innovation projects except for 
the fact that R&D investment is more productive in imitation than in innovation. If imitation 
succeeds, –the imitative step is at least as large as the distance between the base product and the 
target product- the end result of the project can only be the target product itself and nothing else. 
Even if the imitative step is bigger than the difference in the technology levels, the firm will be 
assumed to achieve the target quality, but no higher.  
 
( , , )( , , )
( )
R n i tn i t
q n

                                                                                                               (4.9)                              
( , , ) ( )n i t Pois                                                                                                                  (4.10)                             
( ) ( )q n q n                                                                                  (4.11)        
                                                                                                               
where ( , , ) :n i t imitation arrival rate for product n  of firm i  at time t 
          ( , , ) :R n i t R&D investment of firm i  in product n at time t  
( ) ( )q n q n   
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           : imitation productivity parameter 
           :  imitation size, a random pick from a Poisson distribution with arrival rate   
           ( ) :q n quality level of the imitated product 
 
A firm is either an innovator or imitator from the beginning and stays as such throughout the 
simulation. Every firm engages in one R&D project at a time and in picking R&D projects, they 
pursue a technology-push strategy. They select R&D projects starting from the highest technology 
base they possess to come up with cutting edge technology possible. The financial resources 
required to imitate a product are lower than to innovate one and the chance of success is higher. 
However, the profits especially from a new-to-the-market innovation are higher compared to an 
imitated product for which the market is already satisfied at least to some degree.  
 
4.4. Patenting 
 
If a newly innovated technology is not patented before, it is eligible for being granted a patent. 
The technologies within the range defined by the patent breadth are also patented by the innovator 
if these technologies are not patented in advance. Patent breadth is symmetrical around the 
innovated technology. To exemplify, if patent breadth is 1, the two technologies (one step higher 
and one step lower than the innovated one on the quality ladder) around are also patented by the 
innovator together with the innovated product itself if these products are not patented before. From 
the time a patent is granted until it expires (patent length), competitors are not allowed to use these 
technologies either for selling or using in their R&D projects. The competitors are allowed to own 
a patented technology by innovation, imitation or new entrants can inherit this technology as exact 
copies of the patent holder. But a patent prevents the competitors from using these technologies.  
 
4.5. The Pseudo-Code of the Model 
 
At the initialization period market is populated with N firms each either as an innovator or imitator 
with a random product portfolio. The maximum R&D intensity which is constant for all firms is 
determined as a function of the patent policy. The minimum R&D intensity is also constant for all 
firms. The routine for the rest of the simulation is implemented as follows: 
 
1. Firms set a price for their each product as a function of profits from that product in the previous 
periods 
2. Firms make marketing expenses for their each product as a function of the quality  
3. Patents with an age over the patent life die 
4. Each consumer determines her ideal product 
5. Consumers sample a few random products, structure their memory sets and purchase the best 
product within this set 
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6. Products with an average market share below a threshold level are deleted from the market. 
Firms with no products to sell leave the market. New firms enter 
7. Firms compute their R&D intensity as a function of their market share 
8. Each firm either innovates or imitates. 
9. Both innovators and imitators check with the patent office to see whether their inventions are 
protected by an active patent. Innovators check with the patent office to see whether they can 
get a patent on their invention 
 
5. Simulation Results 
 
5.1. Model Dynamics 
 
The results of the simulation analysis will be presented within this section2. The data for the 
analysis is produced as an average over 100 simulation runs of 1000 steps with a patent length of 
30 and a patent breadth of 1. The only thing that changes from one simulation to the other is the 
seed value which is a number used to initialize the pseudorandom generation process. This seed 
value governs all the stochastic processes within the model and two simulations with the same 
seed value always give the very same results. We start with introducing the evolution of the main 
variables of interest in the model to answer our very first research question: how R&D activities of 
firms and heterogeneous consumer preferences interact in structuring the evolution of an industry. 
 
 
Figure 2. Inverse Herfindahl Index for the number of firms 
 
Figure 2 reports inverse Herfindahl index for the number of firms3. The inverse Herfindahl index 
is the number of firms with equal market share that would generate the same concentration as that 
                                                            
2 The model was implemented on the Laboratory for Simulation Development platform (Valente, 2008). Software and 
documentation for the platform are available at www.labsimdev.org. The code and configuration file of the model is 
available from the author upon request.  
3 The formal definition of the inverse Herfindahl index is 2
1
1/
n
i
i
s

 where 2is is the squared market share of firms. 
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measured in the actual market, consequently measuring the dispersion (or inverse of 
concentration) of the market (Marengo & Valente, 2010). Figure 2 signifies a severe shake-out of 
firms from the beginning of the simulation run until the figure reaches its lowest value when the 
market concentration is at its maximum. This is followed by dispersion where a higher number of 
firms share the market creating a more competitive environment and stabilization for the following  
 
 
Figure 3. Market share of innovative firms (%) 
 
periods. The model is initialized with a population of firms with wide-ranging product 
sets/knowledge bases. Those which cannot successfully serve to heterogeneous consumer needs 
are eliminated from the market in the early periods stabilizing the concentration rate for the 
following terms. Another reason for this rapid increase in the market concentration is the 
emergence of the patent holder of the first few innovations as a market leader. This situation is 
traceable in Figure 3. At the start of the simulation, half of the firms are innovators and the other 
half are imitators. Hence innovator firms have approximately 50% of the total market to begin 
with. The very first few innovations make the patent holder the market leader increasing the 
market concentration and market share of the innovators very rapidly. Subsequently imitator firms 
copy and sell these products after the patents expire decreasing the market share of the leader and 
increasing dispersion in the market. 
 
Figure 4 allows us to observe the maximum (upper series) and the minimum (lower series) level of 
qualities available in the market. Whereas the maximum quality level is mainly determined by the 
R&D activities of the firms and the minimum level mainly by the competitive forces and 
heterogeneous consumer tastes, the interaction between demand and supply dynamics affects these 
levels both. The continuous introduction of new products by innovation raises the maximum 
quality and renders low quality products obsolete by shifting consumer preferences towards high-
tech products. 
 
Technological change is the engine of economic growth in this model. If for some reason 
technology creation comes to a halt (e.g. imitators conquer innovators dominating the whole 
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market and leaving innovators with no financial resources to innovate), wealth creation also 
stagnates. Therefore both consumers and imitator firms depend upon innovators firms to prosper. 
The change in the slopes of these curves which corresponds to a slowing down in the pace of 
technological change results from the lower market share of innovators in the later periods than in 
 
 
 Figure 4. Maximum (upper series) and minimum (lower series) quality levels available 
 
the previous periods. Drawing upon this graph, the reader should not be deceived that the model 
produces innovative progress at a steady state growth rate. It should be reminded that the above 
graph is created using data as an average over 100 simulation runs. When we observe the same 
series for a single run as in Figure 5 below, we see that innovations come in waves; times of rapid 
technological change is followed by stable periods when there is no technological advancement at 
the sector level. 
 
 
Figure 5. Maximum (upper series) and minimum (lower series) quality levels 
available for a single run 
 
One can see the total number of active patents (patents are active unless they expire at a time fixed 
by patent length) in Figure 6. The initial hike in the number of patents can be explained by the 
obvious fact that new patents are continuously taken before the time has come for the very first 
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ones to expire. Starting from the simulation period when the very first patent reaches statutory 
patent life, the graph follows first a gradual decreasing trend and then it stabilizes to a degree.  The 
explanation for this trend should be searched for within the innovation production function and the 
size of the market share of innovators. Firstly, innovation arrival rate is a negative function of the 
quality of the product to invest in: complexity of the product decreases the likelihood of the 
research success. Hence, it is getting harder and harder to come up with an innovation as 
technology progresses. Secondly, there are diminishing returns to R&D; additional investments 
increase arrival rate in a decreasing manner. The decrease in the market share of innovators also 
adds to this declining trend.  As an opposite effect, firms and hence their R&D budgets grow in 
time which should raise total number of active patents ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, this effect 
alone cannot buck the declining trend. In the following periods, all these effects combine to create 
a fairly stable number of patents. 
 
 
Figure 6. Total number of active patents 
 
Figure 7 shows total profits created at the sector level (black), total consumer utility (red) and total 
welfare (green) which is the sum of total profits and consumer utility. Technological progress 
alone accounts for the sustained upward trend in these variables. The production cost of a product 
is linearly related with its quality. Price is initialized as a mark-up over cost and this is the 
minimum price allowed, which means that sales of a product always bring positive profits and 
ceteris paribus higher quality products mean higher profits. Technological progress boosts 
consumer utility, because consumers draw more benefit from consuming better quality goods. 
Another observation is that total profits rise faster than total consumer utility. The ever increasing 
general price level which is responsible for the rise in total profits appears with a negative sign in 
the utility function of the consumers and hence slows down the increase in total consumer utility. 
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Figure 7. Total Profits (blue), Consumer Utility (green) and Welfare (red) 
 
5.2. Simulation Experiments 
 
This subsection includes the results of a series of simple simulation experiments designed to 
analyse how the main variables of interest are conditioned by patent length and patent breadth. 
Patent length is the life time of a patent and patent breadth is the range of products protected by 
patent rights. The following graphs are created by varying patent policy parameters ceteris 
paribus. The analysis in this section is based on data derived as averages of end of simulation 
values of variables over 100 simulation runs each with a different seed value. For the experiments, 
patent length is varied within a range of 10 to 100 and patent breadth within a range of 1 to 10. We 
start with reporting on the effects of the patent policy on the market share of innovative firms.  
 
The model includes two types of firms: innovators and imitators. As imitators can only copy 
already existing technologies, it is always an innovator who can get a patent. Therefore a stronger 
patent system which gives the patent holder the exclusive right of selling a patented technology for 
a longer period of time will result in innovators seizing a larger share of the market. This line of 
reasoning is confirmed by Figure 8; the higher the patent length the higher the market share of 
innovator firms. Imitator firms which cannot compete with the patent holder drawing upon their 
inferior goods lose their market share to innovators. Hence patent policy can be used as a tool by 
the policy maker to transfer resources from imitators to innovators or vice versa. The reader 
cannot observe a gradual increase or decrease in the market share of innovators as patent breadth 
changes. This is due to the pace of technological change at the sector level which is determined by 
the technology leader firm taking the patents. The average size of the innovative step for the 
technology leader is always lower than 1. Hence technology space is explored in full rather than 
intermittently. Under such a condition it does not make a difference from the perspective of 
followers whether patent breadth is low and most of the innovations by the technology leader 
result in a patent covering a small range of products or patent breadth is high and only some 
innovations by the leader bring about a patent covering a wide range of products.  
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Figure 8. Market share (%) of innovator firms as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
 
 
Figure 9. 3-D version of Figure 8 
 
Figure 10 reports inverse Herfindahl index as a function of patent length and patent breadth. A 
lower value of this index corresponds to a more concentrated market structure. One would expect 
that stronger patents consolidate the market position of the patent holders increasing the 
concentration rate. This is explicitly what we observe as patent length increases. For the same 
reasons explained in the previous paragraph we do not see a regular change in the index value 
along patent breadth axis. Technology leader firm is the one taking the patents and it does not 
matter if only a few technologies are patented for most of the innovations when patent breadth is 
low or many products are patented for a few innovations when patent breadth is high.  
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 Figure 10. Inverse Herfindal Index as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
 
 
               Figure 11. 3-D version of Figure 10 
 
There are three mechanisms at work determining the level of technological progress in the model. 
To begin with, it is the innovators who develop the state of the art and they depend on their R&D 
budget in this endeavour. So any intervention shifting resources from imitators to innovators 
fosters technological change ceteris paribus. Secondly, the maximum R&D share out of revenues a 
firm ready to spend for technology development is contingent upon the perception of the patent 
policy. A firm is more inclined to invest in technology if it can protect a wider range of products 
when awarded by a patent and the firm can enjoy its exclusive patent rights for a longer period. 
The maximum R&D intensity is positively related with patent length and patent breadth. If that 
was all to the story, the diagonal increase at the top left hand corner of Figure 12 would be 
continuous and the fastest technological progress would occur where the innovators’ market share 
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and the maximum R&D intensity peak, namely with the highest patent length and breadth. But as 
Figure 12 shows, this is not the case and there is one more mechanism responsible for this result. 
Accumulation of financial resources in the hands of the innovators automatically creates an 
oligopolistic market structure. The market leaders with consolidated market positions and weaker 
threats from the competitors cut back on their R&D spending. R&D share out of total revenues is 
a negative linear function of the market share of the firm. All these mechanisms interact to create 
the picture as we see in Figure 12. The optimum conditions for the maximum technological 
progress occur for a patent breadth of 10 and a patent length of 40. The minimum technology 
levels available to the consumers draw a similar picture as seen in Figure 14. This variable also 
reaches its peak with a patent breadth of 10 and a patent length of 40 
 
 
Figure 12. Maximum technology levels as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
 
Figure 16, 18 and 20 report total profits created by all firms, total consumer utility and total 
welfare at the sector level, respectively. It complies with our expectations that these graphs are 
very similar to Figure 12: maximum technology levels achieved. Firms make higher profits by 
selling higher quality goods, because production cost is positively related with quality level and 
price is set as a mark-up over production costs; and consumers draw higher utility from consuming 
better quality products. Total welfare is a simple sum of total profits and consumer utility. Thereby 
the parameter space where total welfare is maximized coincides with the one where maximum 
technology levels peak in Figure 12, namely when patent breadth is 10 and patent length is 40. 
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Figure 13. 3-D version of Figure 12 
 
 
Figure 14. Minimum technology levels as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
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Figure 15. 3-D version of Figure 14 
 
 
Figure 16. Total profits as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
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Figure 17. 3-D version of Figure 16 
 
 
 Figure 18. Total consumer utility as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
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Figure 19. 3-D version of Figure 18 
 
 
Figure 20. Total welfare as a function of patent length and patent breadth 
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Figure 21. 3-D version of Figure 20 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper is meant to analyse the interaction between R&D activities of firms and heterogeneous 
consumer preferences in structuring the evolution of the industry and the effects of patent length 
and patent breadth on market outcomes. The proposed methodology is to develop an evolutionary, 
multi-agent based, sector-level innovation model addressing the supply and demand side of the 
market simultaneously with the co-evolution of heterogeneous consumer preferences, 
heterogeneous firm knowledge bases and technology levels at the micro level. A simultaneous 
consideration of technological progress and market dynamics with the help of agent-based 
modelling techniques allowed us to analyse such a multi-faceted phenomenon. 
 
Using an agent-based model brought about a few important advantages over other modelling 
techniques in the relevant literature. The first is that it enabled studying a dynamic search process 
with sequential innovation rather than a single, isolated innovation. Secondly, ABM allowed us to 
have heterogeneous consumers rather than employing a representative agent on the demand side. 
Lastly, rather than single-product firms, the market is populated with multi-product firms which 
can serve to different niches of consumers concurrently. In sum, ABM provided the essential 
dynamics with heterogeneous agents, which is an essential foundation for a sector level innovation 
model and which is a better representation of the reality. 
 
As a policy implication, the optimum patent policy seems to be granting broad patents for a 
limited period of time. In parallel with several empirical and theoretical studies referred to in the 
literature review, the results suggest that the patent policy should not be too weak or too strong to 
achieve the desired policy results. A “mild” patent policy appears to be the optimum one to 
maximize technological progress and total welfare by striking a balance between giving the 
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adequate incentives to do R&D and avoiding an overly oligopolistic market structure when 
innovation is sequential. 
 
A possible extension to this study would be repeating this simulation exercise for a complex 
product in a multi-dimensional technology space rather than in a one-dimensional one as in this 
study. A complex product space may have implications for the model results and hence for policy 
advice. It also remains to see what happens when a structural market characteristic (e.g. market 
size) or a behavioural rule (e.g. R&D intensity, utility function) is changed. Another possible 
extension will be letting firms switching between being an innovator or imitator in time due to 
varying market and technological conditions rather than an exogenous imposition of strategies 
right from the beginning. Such a formulation would be a much more realistic representation of 
firms and let us study firm specific and aggregate factors leading to adoption of and shift from/to 
different strategies. 
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Appendix 
 
1. Initialization of the main parameters of the model 
 
FirmuNum=50: the initial number of firms 
marketsize=50000: the number of consumers 
SubmarketNum=500: the number of submarkets 
MinTech=1: the minimum initial technology level 
Maxtech=10: the maximum initial technology level 
betainn=0.5: the productivity of innovation 
betaimit=0.8: the productivity of imitation 
ris=3: the size of the gap between two consecutive goods in different classes where no products 
are defined 
pricespeed=0.1: the speed with which price of a product responds to a change in its profit 
pm=30%: profit margin 
cm=1: the parameter that links the initial price of a product to its quality  
MaxNumProd=5: the minimum initial number of products of a firm 
MinNumProd=10: the maximum initial number of products of a firm 
marketingshare=10%: the share of marketing expenses in total revenue 
r&dintensity_max=10%: the maximum share of R&D budget in total revenue 
r&dintensity_min=0%: the minimum share of R&D budget in total revenue 
ric=2: radical innovation constant in utility function 
techidealcosnt~Uniform(0,1): the parameter picked from a uniform distribution that defines the 
ideal product for a consumer between minimum and maximum technology level available 
MemorySize=5: the number of goods in the memory of a consumer 
GoodNum=5: the number of new goods consumers evaluate for a purchase every period 
patent length=[10,100]: the time period between a patent is granted and it terminates when its 
statutory life is over 
patent breadth=[1,10]: the degree to which a product must differ from a patented one to be 
granted a patent 
 
 
2. Main variables of the model 
 
Welfare: total welfare created by all firms 
ProfitSector: total profits of the firms 
UtilityConsumerTot: total utility of the consumers 
TechMax: the maximum technology level 
TechMin: the minimum technology level 
Ms_Inn: market share of the innovators 
InvHerf: the inverse of the Herfindahl index 
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PatentNumber: total number of active patents 
Marketing: marketing expenses of a firm 
r&dint: R&D share of a firm out of its total revenue 
Price: price of a product 
Profit: profit from a product  
TechIdeal: the ideal product for a consumer between minimum and maximum technology level 
available 
Utility: the utility level derived from a good by a consumer 
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